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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a duopoly market for healthcare where one of the two providers
is publicly owned and charges a price of zero, while the other sets a price so as to max-
imize its profit. Both providers are subject to congestion in the form of an M/M/1
queue, and they serve patient-consumers who have randomly distributed unit costs
of time. Consumer demand (as market share) for both providers is obtained and
described. The private provider’s pricing decision is explored, equilibrium existence
is proven, and conditions for uniqueness presented. Comparative statics for demand
are presented. Social welfare functions are described and the welfare maximizing
condition obtained. More detailed results are then obtained for cases when costs
follow uniform and Kumaraswamy distributions. Numerical simulations are then
performed for these distributions, employing several parameter values, demonstrat-
ing the private provider’s pricing decision and its relationship with social welfare.
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1. Introduction
Waiting times are a problem affecting most health care systems. This is especially
true where rationing is required, although its root cause is simply that capacity is
limited while treatments take time to perform. Queueing imposes a further cost on
the patient-consumer, and in this way, health care fits into a wide body of literature
which deals with the economic causes, behaviour and consequences of queues.
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Rationing is common in public health care systems, such as the British NHS. Where
systems of this type are present, a private sector often remains in operation, being
able to offer shorter waiting times to those willing to pay. The present paper deals
with the pricing decisions of a single profit maximizing private provider of healthcare,
which operates in a market also served by a public provider offering free treatment.
The approach to modelling the health care market follows a simplified version of that
outlined in (Goddard, Malek, & Tavakoli, 1995). However, unlike that model, where the
focus was on the NHS sector and its outcomes, the present paper focuses on the pricing
decisions of the private sector: in particular, in (Goddard et al., 1995) the private sector
set a market clearing price by design, and was not subject to congestion, whereas
here the sole private provider exercises market power and is subject to congestion
in a manner similar to the public sector—although in equilibrium, congestion will
be lower in the former. The present model yields similar results to (Goddard et al.,
1995) regarding the responses of demand for public and private sector treatment when
capacity increases, namely, that an increase in capacity reduces expected waiting time
in the public sector, and therefore increases demand for that sector while reducing
it for the private. However, in the present model price is a decision variable, so that
its response to an increase in capacity cannot be compared with the market-clearing
response in that model.
The private provider’s decision problem is solved with recourse to the basic model of
competition in waiting times presented in (Levhari & Luski, 1978; Luski, 1976), taking
a special case where one provider charges price zero (i.e., the NHS). This work’s chief
contribution is the analysis of private sector decisions when it is subject to congestion
and possesses market power. It is appropriate to use queueing theory to model the
waiting time features of the Health Care market, as argued persuasively by (Goddard
et al., 1995). Queueing has been a subject of economic analysis since the seminal work
of (Naor, 1969), which dealt with optimal queue sizes in M/M/1 FCFS queues, and
sketched a framework for individual decisions taken by impatient consumers which has
been almost universally followed. These results were extended to an arbitrary number
of queues by (Knudsen, 1972).
1.1. Related Literature
Both (Levhari & Luski, 1978; Luski, 1976) employed the queueing framework to model
duopolistic competition between two identical providers selling a good whose provision
requires queueing. The two providers simultaneously choose price, and this decision
affects demand both directly and indirectly through waiting time. Consumers are
differentiated through a randomly distributed unit cost of waiting time. The key result
of (Levhari & Luski, 1978) is to show there is a separating equilibrium where one
provider specializes in serving consumers with high waiting costs at a high price,
and the other provider serves consumers with low waiting costs at low prices. This
framework is adapted for the present paper, with the public sector charging a price of
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zero, and the outside option being constructed such that no consumer will choose it
in equilibrium.
A model similar to that in (Levhari & Luski, 1978) was devised by (Chen & Frank,
2004) for a monopolist provider, and then extended to a duopoly in (Chen & Wan,
2003). Their model assumes the presence of an outside option, and allows for hetero-
geneous firms. (Lederer & Li, 1997) has some relevance for the present problem, as it
deals with consumer heterogeneity in delay cost, which is important in the health care
context. (Li & Lee, 1994), describe a model of competition in three product charac-
teristics: price, quality and service speed, where the good’s value declines with time.
This value-decay assumption is often used in the health economics literature.
More recently, (Melo, 2014) established the existence and uniqueness of a pure
strategy price equilibrium in a congested market with free entry and price competition.
His results predict congested markets will have a greater number of firms than is
socially optimal. (Dube & Jain, 2014) revisited the Bertrand equilibrium between
providers competing on cost and waiting time in a congestible system, found the
conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, then considered a setting where
differentiated services with quality of service guarantees were introduced. However,
this was found not to result in any global welfare improvement. (Deck, Kimbrough, &
Mongrain, 2014) set up a model of duopoly competition on time and price, where one
provider sets up an express and a regular checkout, charging for the former, competing
with another with only one checkout. This was found to be harmful to sellers and
beneficial to consumers, with the single queue seller servicing patient shoppers, driving
down prices and profits, but increasing consumer surplus.
Models in this family have been applied to markets other than health care as well.
(Zhou, Albuquerque, & Grewal, 2016) presents a model of competition in the airline
industry where delay is one of several factors firms compete on, and analyse how
strategic interactions affect the optimal delay and reliability measures. (Mazalov &
Melnik, 2016) also consider a market for transport, where providers compete in price
and service time, and solve the pricing problem for providers, defining the equilibrium
intensity flows.
Moving away from industrial organization to the fields of health economics and
the economics of publicly provided private goods, (Barzel, 1974) presents a theory of
rationing “free” goods through waiting which is relevant to public health care provi-
sion, but does not have queueing as an important feature. (Iversen, 1993) has a model
of resource allocation to meet waiting times within a national health service setting.
(Hoel & Sæther, 2003) and (Marchand & Schroyen, 2005) also consider competition
between private and public health providers—making important contributions to the
welfare economics of the issue. This draws on previous work by (Lindsay & Feigen-
baum, 1984) (and see (Cullis & Jones, 1986)), where rationing by waiting lists is used,
with value decay rather than cost of time used to represent consumer impatience. Pri-
vate providers have no capacity constraints, and therefore no queueing in equilibrium.
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This value decay approach is followed by (Iversen, 1997), who however is chiefly con-
cerned with whether rationing occurs in the public sector, and does not use queuing
models.
(Propper, 2000) continued in the same vein as (Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984) by
considering no capacity constraints in the private sector, and using this to analyse
empirically the demand for private care in the UK. (Dimakou, Dimakou, & Basso,
2015) also develop an empirical model to find how hospitals characteristics determine
waiting, finding the waiting time distribution for UK hospitals in the 1997-2005 period,
and how changes to that distribution are affected by resource allocation, and priorities
given to different kinds of patients.
More closely related to the present work, (Gravelle & Schroyen, 2016) model a set-
ting of a public health system with different possible rules for hospital payment, where
providers can choose quality. They develop a stochastic model of rationing by wait-
ing and use it to derive welfare maximising payment to hospitals, which are linked
to output, expected waiting times, quality, and a few other features. Crucially, they
show that quality and waiting times must not be the only factors affecting price for
optimal outcomes to occur. (Andritsos & Aflaki, 2015) use a game-theoretic queueing
model to examine the effect of a hospital’s objective (i.e., non-profit vs. for-profit) in
hospital markets for elective care. They find the presence of competition can preclude
a hospital from achieving economies of scale, and therefore increase waiting times.
Moreover, they find that whether hospitals will engage in homogeneous and heteroge-
neous competition depends on the patients’ willingness to wait before receiving care
and the reimbursement level of the non-profit sector.
Finally, (Farnworth, 2003) is quite similar to the present paper, including capacity
constraints on the fee-charging provider. The difference between it and the present
paper is that while there is a fee-charging provider “competing” with a “free” one,
the former has the same ‘social’ objectives as the latter and is therefore not profit
maximizing, presenting a completely different problem. Indeed, the author specifically
describes the model as presenting “two private hospitals that are publicly funded,”
and pricing decisions are made by “policy makers,” for “equity reasons,”—it is the
service rate that is the hospitals’ decision variable. Conversely, the sole objective of
the private sector provider in the present paper is profit maximization, and it operates
without reference to externally set social policy. Nevertheless, he reaches a similar
result in regard to waiting times’ response to a price increase: a decrease (increase)
in the fee-charging (free) sector, providing corroboration of one of the present model’s
results.
2. The Model
The model combines (Goddard et al., 1995)’s approach to queueing in health care
markets with the framework for duopoly competition in price and waiting time in
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(Levhari & Luski, 1978). Adaptations to the latter include: i) restricting the public
provider to charge a price of zero; and ii) instead of there being a disutility of waiting in
the queue, and positive utility coming from a good bought after being served, disutility
accrues regardless of whether one chooses to queue or not (reflecting the suffering
caused by disease) and the ‘good’ to be purchased is a treatment which eliminates
the suffering. This is similar to what has been developed in (Farnworth, 2003; Iversen,
1997; Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984), and others. However, the framework represents
an ongoing disutility rather than an exponential decay of treatment value, as generally
assumed. While it can be shown that the two approaches are formally equivalent (for
which, see Appendix A), the one adopted here is more in keeping with the approach
adopted in the queueing literature.
2.1. Consumers
Consumers are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, whose utility function is lin-
ear in waiting time, and whose expected lifespan from the time of disease occurrence
is τ .1 The intuition behind the specification adopted here is that in healthcare, the
value of a treatment is not so much a pure benefit, but the removal of a pre-existing
condition causing disutility. The assumption that the disease does not cause a shorten-
ing of expected lifespan, but only disutility during that lifespan, obviously exchanges
some generality for simplicity of treatment, but that accurately reflects many condi-
tions, including some that cause the most problems with waiting times (hip fractures
requiring a hip replacement are a notorious example).
Consumers suffer a disutility of c per unit of time, which can be interpreted as
the severity of the consumer’s illness. As illness severity varies across consumers, c is a
random variable following a continuous and bounded probability distribution function:
f(c), x ∈ [0, c¯], (1)
where c¯ is finite and F (c) is the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
Disease cost c is suffered until removed by treatment at Ti, the waiting time for
provider i = {n, p}, where n denotes the public and p the private providers. If the
consumer does not seek treatment, they will suffer c until death, i.e., for τ units of
time. The expected utility of seeking treatment from provider i is then:
Ui = −cTi − Pi, (2)
where Pn = 0, and Pp = P is the price charged by the private provider. The expected
utility of foregoing treatment, Uo, is:
Uo = −cτ .
1As consumers are risk neutral, the expectations term is omitted throughout.
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Total potential demand for health care is given by the exogenous parameter λ. This
can be thought of as representing a patient population which is fixed in the short-run.
The two providers will each service a share of this total, which will be the arrival rate
for that provider’s queue.2 Following the literature (e.g., (Levhari & Luski, 1978)),
this parameter is normalized such that λ = 1, without any loss of generality, because
the unit of time t is arbitrary, so that it is always possible to find one measure of time
for which the arrival rate is 1.
Unlike (Goddard et al., 1995), there is no consideration of consumer income—all
consumers can afford the private sector treatment. While this is a restrictive assump-
tion, made in the interest of simplicity, the problem is treated in this way to allow for
a clear focus on the private provider’s pricing decisions in response to the public sec-
tor provision. Interaction with consumer income constraints and heterogeneity, while
doubtlessly important, is left for further research.
2.2. Providers
It is assumed that neither the private nor the public sectors have costs, or in what is
perhaps a preferable interpretation, those costs are sunk in the short-run. It is further
assumed that for both the private and public sectors, service times are identically
and independently distributed along an exponential distribution with rate µ. The
assumption is made that µ > 1, meaning that either server is capable of, by itself,
serving the entire demand stream λ = 1. The assumption is required in order to
avoid explosive growth of waiting times. This rate is exogenous and common to both
servers. This parameter can be taken to reflect the state of technology. For example,
improvements in surgical techniques allowing for hospital stays to be reduced would
lead to an increase in the service rate. In what is a simplifying departure from (Goddard
et al., 1995), it is assumed that only one consumer can be treated at a time. This turns
the queueing process into the well known M/M/1 system.
Expected waiting time for each provider, as a function of arrival and service rates,
can be obtained from a well known result in queueing theory (see, inter alia, (Gross,
Shortle, Thompson, & Harris, 2008)):
Ti =
1
µ− λi
, i ∈ {n, p}. (3)
As the present paper is concerned with the analysis of competition between public and
private providers in health care, the assumption will be made that both the public and
private providers exist and are used by at least one consumer. For this to happen, it
must be the case that Un = −cTn > Uo = −cτ , which implies that τ > Tn. Since,
by assumption, the public sector does not charge for treatment, regardless of demand,
2It is not required that the two shares add up to 1, as patients can opt for not seeking treatment. Nevertheless,
given the way the model is constructed, the shares of the two providers will always add up to 1 in equilibrium.
An explanation follows below.
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and τ > Tn, no consumers will forego treatment, and the public sector will serve its
entire demand stream at zero monetary cost.
Meanwhile, private sector demand, given the exogenous parameter µ, is a function
of P , which is set at the value that maximizes the provider’s instantaneous profit
function:
max
P
pi = max
P
λpP . (4)
3. Demand
3.1. Individual Choice
An individual consumer chooses to seek care from a particular provider if two condi-
tions are satisfied: his expected utility is larger than that of joining the waiting list for
the other provider, and it is larger than that of foregoing treatment.
For a consumer with a given value of c, expected utility when seeking care from the
private or public provider can be obtained from eq. (2):
Up = −cTp − P , (5)
and
Un = −cTn. (6)
A consumer will then seek care from the private sector when:
c >
P
Tn − Tp
. (7)
On the other hand, the consumer will choose the public provider when (assuming
indifferent consumers will opt for the public sector):3
c ≤
P
Tn − Tp
. (8)
Let c∗ be the critical value of c for which a consumer is indifferent between the two
providers:
c∗(P, Tn, Tp) =
P
Tn − Tp
. (9)
3Returning to the assumption that both a public and a private sector exist, and are used by at least one
consumer, it must be the case that Tp < Tn, and therefore Tp < τ . Proof by contradiction: for Up > Un, it is
necessary that c > P
Tn−Tp
. But if Tp > Tn, this requires that c < 0, which is not a possible value of c. Cf. a
similar discussion in (Luski, 1976).
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3.2. Market Demand
Market demand for the private and public providers is obtained from the individual
optimization process described in subsection 3.1. Potential demand λ divides itself
between the two providers, with the share of consumers with c ≤ c∗ choosing the
public provider, and the share with c > c∗ the private provider, so that as c∗ decreases,
the private provider’s market share increases. The two demand functions are then:
λp =
∫ c¯
c∗
f(c) dc⇒λp(c
∗) = 1− F (c∗), and (10)
λn =
∫ c∗
0
f(c) dc⇒λn(c
∗) = F (c∗). (11)
It can be seen from eq. (9) that c∗ is itself a function of Tn, Tp, and P . The former two
values (as set out in eq. (3)) are themselves a function of demand and the parameter
µ. Ultimately, demand is then determined by the shape of f(c), and the values of µ
and P , the latter being the private provider’s decision variable, as set out in subsection
4.3 below.
4. Supply
4.1. Providers
Waiting times Tn and Tp depend on P , but only indirectly through λn and λp, both
of which are a function of c∗. So it is possible, through implicit differentiation, to
show that c∗ is increasing in P even when taking into account the indirect effects,
where c∗, λp and λn are as presented in (9)-(11). The direct effect corresponds to the
direct increase of c∗ in response to P , while the indirect effects are those mediated by
the increase in Tn and decrease in Tp caused by the shift in the respective demands
in response to an increase in price. Let c∗′P ≡
∂c∗(P,Tn(λn(c∗),µ),Tp(λp(c∗),µ))
∂P
, the total
derivative of c∗ with regard to P . This is given by the following expression:4
c∗′P =
[
(Tn − Tp) + c
∗f(c∗)(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
> 0. (12)
This result leads to the following two lemmas, which establish that private sector
demand is bounded between 0 and half of the market:5
Lemma 1. For any continuous distribution function f(c), x ∈ [0, c¯] meeting the con-
ditions in (1), there is a price P¯ which at the limit makes demand for the private
provider equal to zero.
4See Appendix B for the more detailed derivation of this and following expressions.
5See Appendix B for the proofs of these, and all following Lemmas and Theorems.
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Lemma 2. For any distribution function f(c), x ∈ [0, c¯] meeting the conditions in
(1), when P → 0, demand for the private sector equals that for the public sector:
λn(c
∗) = λp(c
∗) = 12 .
As ∂λp/∂P < 0, this further implies that demand for private sector treatment will
never exceed that for the public sector.
4.2. Comparative Statics
The same process can be used to ascertain the effects a shock to µ will have on c∗, if
P does not change. Let c∗′µ ≡
∂c∗(P,Tn(λn(c∗),µ),Tp(λp(c∗),µ))
∂µ
, the total derivative of c∗
with regard to µ. Then:
c∗′µ =
P
(
T 2n − T
2
p
)
(Tn − Tp)2 + Pf(c∗)
(
T 2n + T
2
p
) > 0, (13)
As demand for either provider, as set out in (10)-(11), is a direct function of c∗ alone,
it is easy to sign their comparative statics in respect of both P and µ, considering P
as a parameter, which yield fairly intuitive results (see Appendix B for the detailed
results): as expected, a price increase will cause demand for the private sector to fall
and that for the public sector to increase. This effect reduces the expected waiting
time for the private sector, for which the consumers with higher time costs are willing
to pay the increased price. Section 4.3 describes the private sector’s pricing decision.
On the other hand, when the service rate increases, expected waiting time falls for
both sectors. This reduces the private sector’s comparative advantage over the public
sector, so that for a constant value of P , its demand would fall—similarly, to retain
the same market share, it would have to reduce P .
4.3. Private Provider Optimization
The profit maximization process follows the model presented in (Levhari & Luski, 1978;
Luski, 1976), but with the public provider constrained to charge a price of zero, so
that the private provider will not interact strategically with the public sector. Rather,
it will set P at the level P ∗ which maximizes its instantaneous profit function:
P ∗ = argmax
P
pi = argmax
P
λpP . (14)
Note that waiting time in both sectors is then determined by the private provider, as
it is a function of P and parameter µ (via c∗). Let pi′P ≡
∂pi(λp(c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ))),P )
∂P
,
the total derivative of pi with regard to P . Then the maximization problem will have
the following first order condition:
pi′P = λp(c
∗(P, Tn(λn, µ), Tp(λp, µ)) + Pλp
′
P = 0, (15)
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where λp
′
P is known to be negative. P
∗ then follows from solving the first order
condition for P :
P ∗ =
1− F (c∗)
f(c∗) c∗′P
=
λp
f(c∗) c∗′P
. (16)
The existence of P ∗ can be easily derived from the intermediate value theorem:
Theorem 1. There exists at least one value of P which maximizes the private
provider’s profits.
The firm’s profit in equilibrium, pi∗ is then given by:
pi∗ = P ∗λp(c
∗(P ∗, Tn(λn, µ), Tp(λp, µ)) =
λp
2
f(c∗) c∗′P
=
(1− F (c∗))2
f(c∗) c∗′P
(17)
While existence could be shown from the first order condition alone, consideration
of the uniqueness of P ∗ requires engaging with the second order condition as well:
Lemma 3. It is a sufficient condition for P ∗ to be a unique local maximum in the
range (0, P¯ ) for:
∂f(c∗)
∂c∗
(
c∗′P
)2
+ f(c∗)
∂2c∗
∂P 2
> 0.
Lemma 3 presents only a sufficient condition, so one cannot guarantee uniqueness
for distributions which do not meet the conditions presented. However, numerical sim-
ulations have failed to produce a counter-example where P ∗ is not an unique maximum
on the relevant range, even when the sufficient conditions set out in the lemma were
not met.
5. Welfare
In the present context, welfare for the consumers seeking treatment from provider i
can be defined as the gain in disease-free time from seeking treatment (τ − Ti), across
all consumers seeking treatment from that provider, i.e., multiplied by the expected
value of c for each demand stream. To this is subtracted the price of seeking treatment
in the case of those consumers choosing the private sector. Therefore, welfare accruing
to consumers in unit time, Wi, i ∈ {n, p}, is given by the following expressions:
Wn(c
∗, Tn) =
(∫ c∗
0
cf(c) dc
)
(τ − Tn)⇒ (18)
Wp(c
∗, Tp, P ) =
(∫ c¯
c∗
cf(c) dc
)
(τ − Tp)− λpP . (19)
Let W be aggregate social welfare, obtained from the sum of the firm’s profit and
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the welfare of the two demand streams. The second term in Wp cancels out the firm’s
profit, so that W is given by:
W =Wn +Wp + pi =
(∫ c∗
0
cf(c) dc
)
(τ − Tn) +
(∫ c¯
c∗
cf(c) dc
)
(τ − Tp)⇒
W (c∗, Tn, Tp) =
(∫ c¯
0
cf(c) dc
)
τ −
(∫ c∗
0
cf(c) dc
)
Tn −
(∫ c¯
c∗
cf(c) dc
)
Tp. (20)
The first term
(∫ c¯
0 cf(c) dc
)
τ = E[c]τ is the expected disutility of seeking no treat-
ment, for all consumers. It is a constant term determined exogenously, the product of
the expected value of c across the consumer population and expected lifespan τ . The
two subsequent terms are the product of the expected value of the share of consumers
seeking demand from each provider, and the expected waiting time for that provider,
so that as waiting time falls, disease-free time increases, as does welfare. Equations
(18)-(20) can be re-written using integration by parts, for which, see Appendix B.
These alternate expressions are more mathematically tractable, while those presented
in the main body are more intuitively understandable.
Let W ′P ≡
∂W (c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ)),Tn(λp,µ),Tn(λp,µ))
∂P
, the total derivative of W with
regard to P . Further, let PW be the social welfare maximizing price, such that
W ′P P=PW = 0; substituting this value back into W yields the largest possible so-
cial welfare WM . Then W ′P is given by:
W ′P = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)
[
c∗(Tp − Tn) + T
2
pE(c ≥ c
∗)[1− F (c∗)]− T 2nE(c ≤ c
∗)F (c∗)
]
. (21)
The last line of equation (21) expresses the tradeoffs at play particularly clearly.
By increasing its price, the private provider increases the welfare accruing to those
consumers who still choose to buy care from the private sector after the price increase,
as the fall in demand causes a fall in expected waiting time (these consumers are
represented by the positive term T 2p (E(c ≥ c
∗)[1− F (c∗)])). On the other hand, welfare
is lost from the increase in expected waiting time in the share of consumers seeking care
from the public provider (represented by the negative term −T 2n (E(c ≤ c
∗)F (c∗))).
(Recall from eq. (9) that the term c∗(Tp−Tn) is the price.) These changes are mediated
via the derivative of the critical value, c∗′P , and the distribution function f(c
∗).
Equation (21) can be used to show it is welfare increasing for the private provider
to charge a strictly positive price:
Theorem 2. The welfare maximizing private sector price is strictly positive (i.e.
PW > 0) for all well behaved distributions where f(c∗) > 0 ∀ c∗ ∈ (0, c¯).
Note, however, that there are positive prices which yield worse outcomes, and this
result does not guarantee that the profit maximizing price will improve welfare when
compared to a price of 0 on both sectors.
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Like several other expressions presented in the foregoing, (21) above is not easily
tractable through analytical means as long as f(c) is not specified. Therefore, section
6 below presents more detailed results for a selection of tractable distributions.
6. Numerical Simulations
This section will present numerical results for a set of probability distributions for
the disutility of waiting, f(c). The Kumaraswamy distribution will be used for this
purpose. This is a bounded continuous distribution, where virtually every continuous
shape can be obtained in the interval [0, 1] 6 by varying its parameters a, b > 0
(for instance, the Uniform distribution is a special case where a = b = 1). It is much
more tractable than the more widely known Beta distribution. The general probability
density function, and cumulative distribution function, are defined as follows:
f(c; a, b) = a b ca−1(1− ca)b−1, (22)
F (c; a, b) = 1− (1− ca)b. (23)
Numerical results will be presented for three different specifications: the uniform
distribution, a left-skewed distribution, and a right-skewed distribution.
Specifically, define the following three probability distribution functions:
f1(c) =1
f2(c) =2c
f3(c) =2(1− c),
where f1(c) is the uniform distribution, f2(c) is a Kumaraswamy distribution with
parameters a = 2 and b = 1 (left-skewed), and f3(c) is a Kumaraswamy distribution
with parameters a = 1 and b = 2 (right-skewed).
To these p.d.f.s correspond the following cumulative distribution functions:
F1(c) = c
F2(c) = c
2
F3(c) = 2c− c
2.
See Appendix C for the development of the model for the distributions used.
The tables below show, for each of the three foregoing distributions, the results
obtained for waiting times, market share, price, profit and social welfare. For the
latter results, let Wn, Wp, and W denote social welfare when the private provider
is charging the profit maximizing price P ∗, for the share of consumers choosing the
6Without loss of generality, as the measure of consumer disutility is arbitrary.
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Figure 1.: Probability Distribution Functions
f1(c)-f3(c)
Figure 2.: Cumulative Distribution Functions
F1(c)-F3(c)
Table 1.: Numerical Simulations for Distribution Function f1(c), τ = 8.
µ Tn Tp λn λp P
∗ pi Wn Wp W P
W WM W2n
1.2 2.719 0.969 0.832 0.168 1.457 0.244 1.829 0.836 2.909 0.163 3.304 3.286
1.5 1.443 0.765 0.807 0.193 0.547 0.106 2.134 1.157 3.397 0.090 3.510 3.500
2 0.831 0.557 0.796 0.204 0.218 0.045 2.272 1.318 3.635 0.045 3.672 3.667
4 0.312 0.264 0.790 0.210 0.038 0.008 2.399 1.446 3.853 0.010 3.858 3.857
public provider, the share choosing the private provider, and the total, respectively;
WM denotes social welfare when the private provider is charging the social welfare
maximizing price PW , and W2n denotes the social welfare when there are two public
providers charging a price of 0 and sharing demand equally. Each table corresponds to
one of the distributions. There follows a section discussing the results presented here.
6.1. Discussion
Analysis of the simulation results yields some notable findings. It is noteworthy that,
for all distributions, as µ increases, W approaches WM even as P and pi fall, though
the latter two values remain strictly positive. This can be intuitively explained as the
increase in µ improving the service of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector,
therefore forcing the latter to reduce its price. This is in line with the result in eq.
(B6) showing λp is decreasing in µ for a constant price—clearly, even when the private
sector changes its price to respond to the fall in demand, the downward pressure on
demand still dominates.
There is a unique value of P ∗—in fact, numerical simulations beyond those displayed
here were not able to produce any counter-example where multiple equilibria emerged.
Comparing the results for the three distributions, one observes similar movements
in welfare, prices and market shares when µ increases. It is interesting to note that
Table 2.: Numerical Simulations for Distribution Function f2(c), τ = 8.
µ Tn Tp λn λp P
∗ pi Wn Wp W P
W WM W2n
1.2 2.596 0.985 0.815 0.185 1.454 0.269 2.650 0.967 3.886 0.122 4.389 4.381
1.5 1.406 0.776 0.789 0.211 0.559 0.118 3.078 1.325 4.522 0.068 4.671 4.667
2 0.818 0.563 0.778 0.222 0.225 0.050 3.284 1.507 4.841 0.034 4.891 4.889
4 0.310 0.265 0.771 0.229 0.039 0.009 3.474 1.653 5.136 0.007 5.143 5.143
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Table 3.: Numerical Simulations for Distribution Function f3(c), τ = 8.
µ Tn Tp λn λp P
∗ pi Wn Wp W P
W WM W2n
1.2 2.897 0.948 0.855 0.145 1.206 0.175 1.148 0.589 1.912 0.127 2.208 2.190
1.5 1.490 0.753 0.829 0.171 0.432 0.074 1.363 0.825 2.262 0.071 2.343 2.333
2 0.846 0.550 0.818 0.182 0.170 0.031 1.452 0.941 2.423 0.035 2.449 2.444
4 0.314 0.262 0.811 0.189 0.029 0.006 1.532 1.032 2.569 0.008 2.572 2.571
Figure 3.: W as a function of P
the private sector’s profit maximizing price is higher for the uniform distribution than
for either of the skewed distributions. This indicates the private sector’s market power
is higher under these circumstances. This is interesting and unexpected. While a full
explanation of this phenomenon if left for further research, one intuitively plausible
explanation is that there are countervailing forces weighing on the private sector’s
market power. On the one hand, if there are relatively few consumers with high values
of c, then the firm must lower the price to increase revenue directly. On the other hand,
there are relatively more consumers with high values of c, the direct effect on revenue
of lowering the price by a small amount will be larger. On the other hand, this will have
a countervailing effect, as more consumers seek to use the private provider, increasing
waiting times and reducing demand. The uniform distribution would seem to be closer
to the best distribution for higher profit than either of the skewed distributions.
Turning to social welfare, this is highest on the left-skewed distribution f2(c), and
lowest on the right-skewed distribution f3(c), presumably because a greater mass of
consumers with a lower time cost has less to gain from the private sector’s presence.
This intuition is confirmed when it is noted f3(c) presents the lowest market share and
profits for the private sector.
When the social welfare is compared with the situation where there are two public
providers charging a price of 0, regardless of the distribution, it is the case that the
private sector equilibrium price produces an inferior outcome to the case where there
are two public providers instead. However, this is always inferior to the socially optimal
outcome where the private provider charges price PW . Figure 3 illustrate this by
showing how, for f1(c), social welfare varies with price for different values of µ, where
the dark dot on each line represents welfare at the profit maximizing price P ∗.
This suggests an argument for price regulation of the private sector. Presumably
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this is due to the private sector functioning as an escape valve for consumers with very
high disease costs who are willing to pay a lot to be served more quickly.
7. Conclusion
Waiting times affect competition in healthcare in a way that is not adequately captured
by traditional models. The present paper, using methods derived from the applications
of queueing theory to Industrial Organization and Health Economics, contributes to
the understanding of this phenomenon, following the lead of (Farnworth, 2003; Lindsay
& Feigenbaum, 1984), among others.
When a profit maximizing private provider acts as a competitor to a public provider
of health care, and that private provider faces capacity constraints resulting in queues,
in a similar manner to the public sector, but can vary its demand by varying the price,
there will always exist at least one price which maximizes the private sector’s profit.
This equilibrium’s uniqueness will depend on the distribution of consumers’ cost of
waiting time/illness severity.
Comparative statics can be obtained for demand functions for any given distribution
of c. Some of the most noteworthy results include that an increase (decrease) in the
price charged by the private sector causes an increase (decrease) in demand for the
public sector, as well as their waiting time; that a positive price for the private sector
is welfare enhancing when compared with free treatment in two providers, and that
an increase in the service rate µ decreases waiting times for both sectors, reducing the
attractiveness of the private sector and lowering its demand. This forces the private
sector to reduce its price, approximating the welfare maximizing value with higher
values of µ. The most promising lead for further research is relaxing the assumption
that both providers have the same service rates, and allowing at least the private sector
to choose its own rate.
Further, the numerical results strongly suggest that the private sector equilibrium
price is too high from a social welfare point of view. Further research should explore
the effects of the public sector charging a regulated small price compared to a private
sector charging a profit maximizing price.
Other warranted topics for further research include, in the first instance, to incor-
porate consumer income constraints and distribution into the decision process. Other
interesting extensions are to incorporate long run capacity decisions by providers, and
allowing for a plurality of private (and possibly public) providers. Numerical simula-
tions of model outcomes for different distributions are also warranted, as is a further
examination of how intertemporal considerations and discounting might affect con-
sumer decisions.
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Appendix A. Equivalence of Exponential and Linear Formulation
Many works addressing waiting times in health care have formulated consumer utility
using exponential decay. The following is an example, taken from (Lindsay & Feigen-
baum, 1984):
Ui = V (u¯, p)e
−gt. (A1)
In (A1), V (u¯, p) is the value of the good, in this case the treatment, which is a
function of a vector of parameters u¯, and of price p. This value decays at rate g per
unit of time t. Applying this function to the present problem, if u¯ is held constant and
V is a linear function of p such that V = v−p, where v is the value of the good before
its price is deducted, (A1) becomes:
Ui = (v − p)e
−gt. (A2)
This can then be transformed by taking logs:
U˜i = lnUi = ln(v − p)− gt. (A3)
Both v and p are arbitrary, so they can be redefined to new values such that Λ =
ln(v − p):
U˜i = Λ− gt, (A4)
where g is equivalent to parameter c in the utility function at equation (2).
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There is still one outstanding issue. The presence of value parameter Λ introduces
some mathematical complications. Moreover, as discussed above, medical treatments,
especially of chronic diseases, can hardly be said to possess intrinsic value for con-
sumers, unless perhaps they suffer from Mu¨nchausen syndrome. Rather, they are
valuable in so far as they removes an illness. Therefore, take price p as being paid
to remove disutility g. It’s perfectly possible to postulate a function V of this kind,
say V = −p, i.e., there is no benefit from the treatment itself other than it causing g
to stop. This yields the following utility function:
Ui = −pe
−gt. (A5)
Taking logs of (A5) yields
U˜i = lnUi = ln(−p)− gt. (A6)
Then once P is defined such that P = ln(−p), the utility function from (2) emerges.
Appendix B. Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 1. As c∗ is a continuous and strictly increasing function of P
(c∗′P > 0), and λp(c
∗) is a continuous and decreasing function of c∗, as defined at
(9), it follows that:
lim
c∗→c¯
λp = 0, (B1)
where P¯ is such that c∗(P¯ , Tn, Tp) = c¯ = F
−1(1).
Proof of Lemma 2. This is the reverse of Lemma 1. As c∗ is a continuous and
strictly increasing function of P (c∗′P > 0), and λp(c
∗) is a continuous and decreasing
function of c∗, as defined at (9), it follows that when P → 0, the two providers are
indistinguishable, as none of them charges for treatment and they offer the same
service rate µ. In this case the market outcome is a Bertrand equilibrium with the two
providers splitting the market equally: limP→0 c
∗(0, Tn, Tp) = F
−1
(
1
2
)
.
Derivation of Equation (12): Recall c∗′P is the total derivative of c
∗ with regard to
P :
c∗′P =
1
Tn − Tp
+
∂c∗
∂Tn
∂Tn
∂λn
∂λn
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂P
+
∂c∗
∂Tp
∂Tp
∂λp
∂λp
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂P
> 0.
Solving, it yields equation (12):
c∗′P =
[
(Tn − Tp) + c
∗f(c∗)(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
> 0, (B2)
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as
∂c∗
∂Tp
= −
∂c∗
∂Tn
=
P
(Tn − Tp)2
;
∂Ti
∂λi
= T 2i , i = {n, p};
∂λn
∂c∗
= −
∂λp
∂c∗
= f(c∗); and (Tn − Tp) > 0.
Derivation of Equation (13): Recall c∗′µ is the total derivative of c
∗ with regard to
µ. Then:
c∗′µ =
∂c∗
∂Tn
(
∂Tn
∂µ
+
∂Tn
∂λn
∂λn
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂µ
)
+
∂c∗
∂Tp
(
∂Tp
∂µ
+
∂Tp
∂λp
∂λp
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂µ
)
> 0, ∀ P > 0.
Solving, it yields equation (13):
c∗′µ =
P
(
T 2n − T
2
p
)
(Tn − Tp)2 + Pf(c∗)
(
T 2n + T
2
p
) > 0, (B3)
where it follows from the waiting time expression at (3) that:
∂Ti
∂µ
= −
1
(µ− λi)2
= −T 2i < 0.
Comparative Statics: Let λp
′
P ≡
∂λp(c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ)))
∂P
, λn
′
P ≡
∂λn(c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ)))
∂P
, λp
′
µ ≡
∂λp(c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ)))
∂µ
, λn
′
µ ≡
∂λn(c∗(P,Tn(λn,µ),Tp(λp,µ)))
∂µ
, the derivatives of λp and
λn in regard to P and µ, respectively.
λp
′
P =
∂λp
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂P
= −f(c∗)c∗′P < 0, (B4)
λn
′
P =
∂λn
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂P
= f(c∗)c∗′P > 0, (B5)
λp
′
µ =
∂λp
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂µ
= −f(c∗)c∗′µ < 0, (B6)
λn
′
µ =
∂λn
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂µ
= f(c∗)c∗′µ > 0. (B7)
Proof of Theorem 1. At least one value P ∗ exists if the first order condition (15)
has at least one zero in the domain P ∈ (0, P¯ ), where P¯ is the value for which λp = 0,
or c∗ = c¯. When P → 0, (15) takes the form:
lim
P→0
[
(1− F (c∗)) + Pλp
′
P
]
> 0,
whereas when P → P¯ , c∗ → c¯, and (15) takes the form:
lim
P→P¯
[
(1− F (c¯)) + P¯ λp
′
P
]
= 0− P¯ f(c¯)c∗′P < 0.
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Since the FOC takes a positive value at one end of the domain, a negative value
at the other, and is continuous across the domain, the intermediate value theorem
implies there is at least one zero.
Proof of Lemma 3. If the derivative of the first order condition is negative across
the specified range, P ∗ will be unique in that range. This follows from the proof of
theorem 1: as one end of the domain is negative and the other positive, and the FOC
is continuous, if its derivative is negative it will only have one zero along that domain.
This condition is given by:
− 2f(c∗)c∗′P − P
[
∂f(c∗)
∂c∗
(
c∗′P
)2
+ f(c∗)
∂2c∗
∂P 2
]
< 0, (B8)
evaluated at P ∗. As c∗′P > 0, (B8) holds under the condition presented in lemma
3.
Alternate Versions of Welfare Functions: Both
∫ c∗
0 cf(c) dc and
∫ c¯
c∗
cf(c) dc can be
rewritten using integration by parts:
∫ c∗
0
cf(c) dc = c∗F (c∗)−
∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc∫ c¯
c∗
cf(c) dc = c¯− c∗F (c∗)−
∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc.
Then Wi and W can be written as follows:
Wn =
(
c∗F (c∗)−
∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc
)
(τ − Tn) (B9)
Wp =
(
c¯− c∗F (c∗)−
∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc
)
(τ − Tp)− λpP (B10)
W =
(
c¯−
∫ c¯
0
F (c) dc
)
τ + c∗F (c∗)(Tp − Tn)− c¯Tp+(∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc
)
Tn +
(∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc
)
Tp.
(B11)
The final expression is especially useful to determine how welfare responds to changes
in price and service rate, as c¯ and τ are constants, while the integrand is the cumula-
tive distribution function. Nevertheless, while the foregoing set is more tractable, it is
preferable to use eqs. (18)-(20) for intuitive reasoning about welfare, as the interpre-
tation of eqs. (B9)-(B11) is not straightforward.
Derivation of Equation (21)
Recall W ′P is the total derivative of W with regard to P , and that P
W is the social
welfare maximizing price. Then W ′P is given by:
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W ′P =
(
c∗′PF (c
∗) + c∗f(c∗)c∗′P
)
(Tp − Tn) + c
∗F (c∗)
(
∂Tp
∂λp
∂λp
∂c∗
c∗′P −
∂Tn
∂λn
∂λn
∂c∗
c∗′P
)
− c¯
∂Tp
∂λp
∂λp
∂c∗
c∗′P +
∂
∂P
(∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc
)
Tn +
(∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc
)
∂Tn
∂λn
∂λn
∂c∗
c∗′P
+
∂
∂P
(∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc
)
Tp +
(∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc
)
∂Tp
∂λp
∂λp
∂c∗
c∗′P ⇔
W ′P = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)
[
c∗(Tp − Tn)− T
2
p
(
c∗F (c∗)− c¯+
(∫ c¯
c∗
F (c) dc
))
+
T 2n
((∫ c∗
0
F (c) dc
)
− c∗F (c∗)
)]
.
W ′P = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)
[
c∗(Tp − Tn) + T
2
p (E(c ≥ c
∗)[1− F (c∗)])− T 2n (E(c ≤ c
∗)F (c∗))
]
.
(B12)
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall the derivative of social welfare w.r.t. price given at eq.
(21):
W ′P = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)
[
c∗(Tp − Tn) + T
2
pE(c ≥ c
∗)[1− F (c∗)]− T 2nE(c ≤ c
∗)F (c∗)
]
.
If the private sector provider were to charge a price of 0, both providers would split the
market equally, and their expected waiting times would be identical (Tn = Tp = T ),
as per Lemma 2. This implies that W ′P P=0 is given by:
W ′P P=0 = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)T
1
2
[E(c ≥ c∗)− E(c ≤ c∗)] . (B13)
As the term in brackets is obviously positive, and as per eq. (13), so is c∗′P ,W
′
P P=0 >
0 for all well behaved distributions where f(c∗) > 0 ∀ c∗ ∈ (0, c¯).
This implies that it is always welfare increasing to raise P above 0, thus completing
the proof.
Appendix C. Results for Selected Distributions
This section presents the development of the model described in the main body for
the distributions used in the numerical simulations.
C.1. Uniform Distribution
Consider first a uniform distribution for c ∈ [0, 1], such that:
f(c) = 1 (C1)
F (c) = c. (C2)
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Under this distribution, demand and waiting time functions take the following forms:
λn = c
∗ , λp = 1− c
∗,
Tn =
1
µ− c∗
, Tp =
1
µ− (1− c∗)
,
which taken together form a system of four equations in four unknowns, easily solvable
analytically.
The derivative of c∗ with regard to price follows easily from c∗:
c∗′P =
[
Tn − Tp + c
∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
,
which allows analytical derivation of the comparative statics outlined in eqs. (B4)-(B5):
λp
′
P = −c
∗′
P = −
[
Tn − Tp + c
∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
λn
′
P = c
∗′
P =
[
Tn − Tp + c
∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
.
The private provider’s optimization problem is presented and solved below:
max
P
pi = max
P
λpP = max
P
(1− c∗)P
pi′P = 0⇔ λp + Pλp
′
P = 0
P ∗ = (1− c∗)
(
Tn − Tp + c
∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
)
.
Once P ∗ is known, equilibrium profit follows easily:
pi = P ∗λp(P
∗) = (1− c∗)2
(
Tn − Tp + c
∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
)
.
For price P ∗, welfare levels Wn, Wp, and W are:
Wn =
1
2
(c∗)2(τ − Tn)
Wp =
1
2
(
1− (c∗)2
)
(τ − Tp)− pi
W =
1
2
[
τ − Tn(c
∗)2 + Tp
(
(c∗)2 − 1
)]
.
The derivative of W with regard to P is then as follows:
W ′P = c
∗′
P
[
Tp
(
c∗ +
Tp
2
(
1− (c∗)2
))
− Tn
(
c∗ +
Tn
2
(c∗)2
)]
.
This can be set equal to 0 and solved for P , yielding PW , the social welfare maximizing
price.
When c is uniformly distributed, the uniqueness of P ∗ follows straightforwardly:
Lemma 4. When c is uniformly distributed, P ∗ is unique.
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Proof. Recall the sufficient condition for uniqueness given at Lemma 3. This is met
when f(c) is the uniform distribution, as the first term ∂f(c∗)/∂c∗
(
c∗′P
)2
= 0 and
the second term is positive, as shown below:
f(c∗)
∂2c∗
∂P 2
= (c∗′P )
−1
[
2(T 2n + T
2
p ) + 2c
∗(T 3n − T
3
p )
]
> 0, (C3)
where (T 3n − T
3
p ) > 0 since Tn > Tp.
C.2. Kumaraswamy distributions
This subsection performs the same exercise as above, but for a Kumaraswamy distri-
bution, as defined in eqs. (22)-(23).
Under this distribution, demand and waiting time take the following forms:
λn = 1− (1− (c
∗)a)b , λp = (1− (c
∗)a)b,
Tn =
1
µ− [1− (1− (c∗)a)b]
, Tp =
1
µ− (1− (c∗)a)b
,
which taken together form a system of four equations in four unknowns, easily solvable
analytically.
The derivative of c∗ with regard to price follows:
c∗′P =
[
Tn − Tp + a b (c
∗)a(1− (c∗)a)b−1(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
,
which allows analytical derivation of the comparative statics outlined in eqs. (B4)-(B5):
λp
′
P = a b (c
∗)a−1(1− (c∗)a)b−1
[
Tn − Tp + a b (c
∗)a(1− (c∗)a)b−1(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
λn
′
P = a b (c
∗)a−1(1− (c∗)a)b−1
[
Tn − Tp + a b (c
∗)a(1− (c∗)a)b−1(T 2n + T
2
p )
]
−1
.
The private provider’s optimization problem is presented and solved below:
max
P
pi = max
P
λpP = max
P
(
1− (c∗)a)b
)
P
pi′P = 0⇔ λp + Pλp
′
P = 0
P ∗ = (1− (c∗)a)b
(
Tn − Tp
a b (c∗)a−1(1− (c∗)a)b−1
+ c∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
)
.
Once P ∗ is known, equilibrium profit follows easily:
pi = P ∗λp(P
∗) = (1− (c∗)a)2b
(
Tn − Tp
a b (c∗)a−1(1− (c∗)a)b−1
+ c∗(T 2n + T
2
p )
)
.
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When price is P ∗, welfare levels Wn, Wp, and W are:
Wn =
(
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
− (1− (c∗)a)bc∗
)
(τ − Tn),
Wp =
(
(1− (c∗)a)bc∗ −
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
+
Γ(a−1 + 1)Γ(b+ 1)
Γ(1 + a−1 + b)
)
(τ − Tp)− pi,
W =
Γ(a−1 + 1)Γ(b+ 1)
Γ(1 + a−1 + b)
τ − c∗(1− (c∗)a)b(Tp − Tn)− Tn
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
+
Tp
(
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
−
Γ(a−1 + 1)Γ(b+ 1)
Γ(1 + a−1 + b)
)
,
where B(x, y, z) is the incomplete Beta function, and Γ(x) is the Gamma function.
The derivative of W with regard to P is then as follows:
W ′P = c
∗′
P f(c
∗)
[
c∗ (Tp − Tn) + T
2
n
((
s−
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
)
− c∗F (c∗)
)
− T 2p
(
c∗F (c∗)− 1 +
(
1− s+
B
(
(c∗)a, a−1, b+ 1
)
a
−
Γ
(
1 + a−1
)
Γ(b+ 1)
Γ (1 + a−1 + b)
))]
,
This can be set equal to 0 and solved for P , yielding PW , the social welfare maximizing
price.
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